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The usual disclaimer applies. 1 Introduction
Almost twenty-￿ve years ago, the seminal contributions by Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986) and Wilson (1986) set the starting point for a vast and still growing theor-
etical literature on capital tax competition.1 In this line of literature, tax compet-
ition is mainly interpreted as tax competition for mobile capital. Accordingly, the
models focus almost entirely on factor markets for (mobile) capital and (immobile)
labor or land. In the background, a perfectly competitive product market without
any friction closes the model.2 However, one might argue that whereas perfect mo-
bility of (￿nancial) capital is a plausible assumption, zero cost of trading products
between countries is not, except for some special cases.
In this short paper, we introduce transport cost of trade in products into the Zo-
drow and Mieszkowski (1986) model and derive the tax competition equilibrium.3
It turns out that the existence of transport cost leads to a complete breakdown
of the main result, i.e. the underprovision of public goods. Instead, a symmetric
equilibrium emerges in which all countries choose an e¢ cient level of public goods
provision. The rationale of this insight is that transport cost in the product sector
imply that small di⁄erences in prices across countries do not give rise to interna-
tional arbitrage. Since the balance of payments requires that trade in goods is
accompanied by capital ￿ ows, imperfect arbitrage on the product market trans-
lates into a certain ￿stickiness￿of capital. This allows governments to marginally
adjust their capital tax rates until the e¢ cient solution is reached. It is important
to note that even small levels of transport cost su¢ ce to switch from ine¢ ciently
low levels of public goods provision to e¢ ciency.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model assumptions. In Section 3 we characterize the market equilibrium for given
capital tax rates. Section 4 then turns to the equilibrium of the tax competition
game between the countries. Section 5 brie￿ y discusses the results and concludes.
1Literally hundreds of papers have since then explored the robustness of the results to various
changes in the modelling approach and a great variety of extensions, many of which are surveyed
in Wilson and Wildasin (2004) and Fuest et al. (2005).
2Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) do not mention the product market explicitly, whereas
Wilson (1986) assumes the existence of two private consumption goods, a local one and a national
one, the latter of which is costlessly tradable across regions.
3We focus on the basic framework introduced by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), but our
results concern the Wilson (1986) model as well. See footnote 14 for how our contribution relates
to the analysis in Wilson (1987).
4Our argument is thus an application of the Diamond (1971) paradox. See Konrad (2010) for
another application of this paradox to tax competition. He considers a model with ￿rm mobility
where ￿rms face search costs, which arise because getting information on the true e⁄ective
corporate tax rate is costly. This leads to a small, though decisive reduction in ￿rm mobility and
allows for an e¢ cient tax competition equilibrium.
12 Setup
We consider the Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) framework in the version presen-
ted by Hoyt (1991),5 and augment it by a transport sector. If transport costs are
assumed to be zero, the model boils down to the original one.
There are n ￿ 2 countries. As country indices we use i;j 2 f1;:::;ng. Each
country hosts a large number of perfectly competitive ￿rms with mass of unity.
The representative ￿rm in country i uses ki units of capital in order to produce a
good according to the production function F(ki), which satis￿es F 0 > 0 > F 00 and
the Inada condition limki!0 F 0(ki) = 1.6 Capital is rented at the world capital
market at an interest rate of r > 0. Denoting the price of the good produced in
country i by pi and the (source-based) capital tax rate set by country i by ti > 0,
the after-tax pro￿ts of the ￿rm located in country i are
￿i = piF(ki) ￿ (r + ti)ki: (1)
The ￿rst-order condition of pro￿t maximization reads
piF
0(ki) ￿ ti = r: (2)
This condition implies that the after-tax marginal return to capital, piF(ki) ￿ ti,
equals the interest rate r and, thus, is equalized across countries.
Each country is populated by a large number of households which is, again,
normalized to unity. The representative household in country i derives utility from
private consumption ci and publicly provided goods gi according to the utility
function ui = U (ci;gi) with Uc;Ug > 0 > Ucc;Ugg. The household is endowed
with savings of ￿ k which are invested at the world capital market. The household￿ s
income is given by interest income r￿ k and after-tax ￿rm pro￿ts ￿i. This income
is used to purchase cii units of the consumption good from ￿rms in country i and
cij units of the consumption good from ￿rms in country j 6= i. If purchased from
￿rms in country i, the consumption good has a price of pi. If purchased in country
j 6= i, i.e. abroad, the price is pj and a transport cost ￿ ￿ 0 per unit of the good
applies. The budget constraint of country i￿ s household is
r￿ k + ￿i = picii +
n X
j6=i
(pj + ￿)cij: (3)
5While Hyot (1991) considers the general case with an arbitrary number of countries, Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986) focus on the case of in￿nitesimally small countries which is obtained as
special case of the Hyot (1991) model if the number of countries converges to in￿nity.
6We can replace the Inada condition by the weaker condition F(0) = 0. This would leave our
results completely unchanged, but comes at the cost of much more complicated proofs.
2Total consumption of the household in country i equals the sum of consumption
from all countries, i.e. ci =
Pn
j=1 cij, where the units produced in di⁄erent countries
are perfect substitutes in consumption.
Each government has only one tax instrument, the unit tax on capital. Govern-
ments purchase private consumption goods and transform them into the publicly
provided good on a one-to-one basis. The government in country i purchases gii
units in its own country and gij units in country j 6= i. Its budget constraint reads
tiki = pigii +
n X
j6=i
(pj + ￿)gij: (4)
Total public consumption in country i amounts to gi =
Pn
j=1 gij.
Transport services are provided by a competitive sector which is exempt from
corporate taxation and has a linear production function. The only input is capital.
Shipping of one unit of the consumption good requires ￿ ￿ 0 units of capital
including the original case of ￿ = 0. Pro￿ts of the transport sector are given by
￿





(cij + gij): (5)
Perfect competition reduces these pro￿ts to zero from which follows
￿ = ￿r: (6)
Zero pro￿ts and tax exemption imply that we neither need an assumption on to
whom the transport ￿rms belong nor on where they are located.7









= n￿ k: (7)
It equates the world capital demand of the production ￿rms and the transport
sector to the world capital supply of the households.
7Assuming that the transport sector is taxed actually does not change the main insights.
However, such an assumption adds a number of complexities arising from the endogeneity of
equilibrium transport costs and the necessity of assuming the location and ownership of transport
￿rms.
33 Market Equilibrium
In this section we analyze the equilibrium of private markets (capital, transport
and product markets), taken as given the capital tax rates of the countries. As a
benchmark, we ￿rst brie￿ y consider the case without transport cost, in order to
replicate the original result, and then turn to the case of positive transport cost.
Zero transport cost. Assume ￿ = 0 and, thus, ￿ = 0. According to the
standard arbitrage argument, the price of the consumption good has then to be
the same in all countries. Otherwise, all consumers purchase the good solely in
the country with the lowest price, implying that demand in all other countries is
zero. However, the Inada condition and (2) render supply in all countries positive
and, thus, prevent such a market equilibrium. Normalizing the common price to
unity we obtain8
pi = 1 for all i. (8)
Equations (2), (7) and (8) determine the capital allocation fkign
i=1, the product
prices fpign
i=1 and the interest rate r as functions of the tax rates ftign
i=1. Totally
di⁄erentiating and following Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) in focusing on a

















nF 00 < 0; j 6= i: (10)
These results show that, in the absence of transport cost, an increase in one coun-
try￿ s capital tax rate drives out capital and, thus, increases the capital supply for
all other countries. The resulting decline in the world interest rate increases capital
demand and restores a new equilibrium. The reason is that capital is perfectly mo-
bile, so changes in the capital tax rates immediately translate into changes in the
user cost of capital and thereby induce capital movements. The relative prices of
the consumption goods remain unchanged due to perfect arbitrage on the product
market.
Positive transport cost. Assume ￿ > 0 and, thus, ￿ > 0. Let p‘ := minfpign
i=1
and pu := maxfpign
i=1 denote the upper and lower bound of the price range of the
consumption good. Then, there are at most three types of countries: countries




j=1(cij + gij) = Pn
i=1 F(ki). With the help of (1), (3) and (4) it is straightforward to show that this condi-
tion is always satis￿ed as identity, which re￿ ects Walras￿law in case of zero transport cost.
Hence, we can follow Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and ignore this equilibrium condition.
4with a price p‘, countries with a price in the interval ]p‘;pu[ and countries with
a price pu. The countries in the ￿rst and the last group are denoted as type ‘
and type u countries, respectively. It can be ruled out that pu ￿ p‘ > ￿, as this
would imply that there is at least one type u country with pu > p‘ + ￿, so the
household and the government of this country purchase the consumption good only
abroad and there is no demand for the good produced in this country. Again, such
a situation cannot be a market equilibrium because the Inada condition and (2)
render supply in type u countries strictly positive. Hence, the arbitrage mechanism
works whenever pu ￿ p‘ > ￿ and reduces the price ranges to pu ￿ p‘ ￿ ￿.
In equilibrium we have either pu ￿ p‘ < ￿ or pu ￿ p‘ = ￿. Under pu ￿ p‘ < ￿,
households and governments in each country purchase the consumption good solely
at home and there is no international trade in consumption goods. In contrast,
if pu ￿ p‘ = ￿, households and governments in type u countries are indi⁄erent
between purchasing the good at home and purchasing it in type ‘ countries. In
this case the consumption good may therefore be traded between countries. This,
however, depends on the the tax rate di⁄erential between tu and t‘ as the following
Lemma states.
Lemma Assuming positive transport cost (￿ = ￿r > 0) and a tax rate di⁄erential
satisfying tu ￿ t‘ ￿ ￿(r + t‘)=p‘ > 0, the resulting market equilibrium implies
pu ￿ p‘ < ￿ and no trade in the consumption good.
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Let the number of type ‘ and type u
countries be denoted by n‘ and nu, respectively. If pu ￿p‘ = ￿, the household and
government in a type u country equally divide their consumption over their own
country and all n‘ type ‘ countries.9 From (3) and (4), in each type u country
we obtain cuu = cu‘ = [puF(ku) + r(￿ k ￿ ku) ￿ tuku]=[pu(1 + n‘)] > 0 and guu =
gu‘ = tuku=[pu(1 + n‘)] > 0. The household and government in a type ‘ country
purchase the good solely at home, so c‘‘ = [p‘F(k‘) + r(￿ k ￿ k‘) ￿ t‘k‘]=p‘ > 0 and
g‘‘ = t‘k‘=p‘ > 0. The product market equilibrium condition in a type u country
is cuu +guu = F(ku). Inserting cuu and guu and employing cuu = cu‘ and guu = gu‘
yields r(￿ k ￿ ku) = pun‘(cu‘ + gu‘) > 0 and, thus, ku < ￿ k. The condition for the
product market equilibrium in a type ‘ country reads c‘‘+g‘‘+nu(cu‘+gu‘) = F(k‘).
Inserting now yields r
￿￿ k ￿ k‘
￿
= ￿p‘nu(cu‘ + gu‘) < 0 and, thus, k‘ > ￿ k. From
F 00 < 0 and (2) follows that ku < ￿ k < k‘ is possible only if F 0(ku) > F 0(k‘) or
(r+tu)=pu > (r+t‘)=p‘. The assumption pu = p‘+￿ then yields the contradiction
F 0(ku) ￿ F 0(k‘) if tu ￿ t‘ ￿ ￿(r + t‘)=p‘. ￿
The intuition behind the Lemma is the following. With pu = p‘ + ￿, there are
9The results remain completely unchanged if we assume an unequal division of purchases.
5countries at the upper bound of the price range (type u) which purchase the good
not only at home but also in countries at the lower bound of the price range
(type ‘). The balance of payments then forces the high-price countries to export
capital to the low-price countries. Hence, the marginal return to capital, piF 0(ki),
is higher in high-price countries than in low-price countries. If tax rates in the two
types of countries are equal, the after-tax marginal return to capital, piF 0(ki) ￿ t,
is not equalized across countries, thereby violating (2) and preventing a market
equilibrium. This argument remains true in the presence of positive, but not too
large capital tax rates di⁄erentials, tu ￿ t‘ ￿ ￿(r + t‘)=p‘ > 0. Note that, in the
absence of trade costs (￿ = 0), an equilibrium without trade only occurs if tu = t‘,
which is consistent with the Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) analysis.
In the next section, we follow Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and focus on the
symmetric tax competition equilibrium with ti = t. Since this implies tu￿t‘ = 0 <
￿(r +t‘)=p‘, we can refer to the market equilibrium with pu ￿p‘ < ￿ and without
trade. Under this condition, each household and each government purchases the
consumption good solely at home, that is cii;gii > 0 and cij = gij = 0 for all i;j
and j 6= i. Then, the product market in country i is in equilibrium if
cii + gii = F(ki); (11)
where (1), (3), (4) and cij = gij = 0 for j 6= i yield
cii = F(ki) +






Inserting (12) into (11) gives n equations which together with (2) for all i and (7)
with cij = gij = 0 for j 6= i determine the equilibrium capital allocation fkign
i=1,
prices fpign
i=1 and interest rate r as functions of the tax rates ftign
i=1.10 Choosing





















These comparative static results are diametral di⁄erent from those in the absence
of transport cost, compare (13) and (14) with (9) and (10). In particular, tax rate
changes now do not a⁄ect the capital allocation, but alter the product prices. The
intuition is that in the presence of positive transport cost the whole production
10Equations (11) and (12) imply that equation (7) is satis￿ed as identity. This is Walras￿law
in the presence of strictly positive transport cost.
6in a country is solely consumed by the household and government of this country.
There is no trade in goods and, thus, the balance of payments requires that there
is also no trade in capital, independent of the capital tax rates.11 Hence, the
introduction of (even small) transport costs makes capital sticky and tax rate
changes translate into price changes that maintain the market equilibrium.
4 Tax Competition
We now turn to the governments￿choice of tax rates. Regardless of whether we











The government of country i maximizes its residents￿utility with respect to the tax
rate ti, taking as given the tax rates of the other countries j 6= i. The equilibrium




















































where in @ui=@ki we have used the ￿rst-order condition (2).
Let us start by brie￿ y replicating the result of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986).
According to (8) and (9), without transport cost we have pi = 1 and @pi=@ti = 0
for all i. Moreover, Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) focus on a symmetric tax
competition equilibrium with ti = t for all i. Equations (2), (7) and pi = 1 then







where " := ￿(@ki=@ti)ti=ki > 0 denotes the capital demand elasticity in country
i with respect to the tax rate in country i. In the absence of transport cost, this
elasticity is strictly positive according to (10). Hence, equation (19) states that in
the tax competition equilibrium the marginal rate of substitution between public
11Formally, equations (13) and (14) imply ki = ￿ k independent of ti.
7and private consumption, Ug=Uc, equals the marginal cost of public funds, 1=(1￿"),
and is thus larger than 1 which re￿ ects the marginal rate of transformation between
public and private consumption. This is the classical underprovision of public
goods result obtained by the previous tax competition literature.
If we introduce (even small but) strictly positive transport cost, equations (11),
(12) and (14) imply ki = ￿ k and @ki=@ti = 0 for all i. Inserting this together with




This condition implies symmetry with ti = t and pi = 1 for all i.12 It states
that the marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal rate of transformation
between public and private consumption. Hence, we have proven the following
Proposition In the absence of transport cost (￿ = ￿r = 0), the symmetric
tax competition equilibrium is characterized by equation (19) and, thus, ine¢ -
cient underprovision of public goods. In contrast, in the presence of transport
cost (￿ = ￿r > 0) there is a symmetric tax competition equilibrium with e¢ cient
public good provision characterized by equation (20).
Taking into account transport cost therefore restores e¢ ciency in capital tax com-
petition between countries. Whereas capital is perfectly mobile if transport costs
are absent, capital becomes sticky in the presence of transport cost, at least in
in a certain parameter range. Then, the use of capital taxes translates into con-
sumer price adjustments and does not lead to capital movements. Under these
circumstances, the individual government is able to increase the capital tax rate
and, thus, public consumption until the e¢ cient levels are attained.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Our analysis shows that introducing even small transport cost to the product
sector of the classical Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) model leads to a complete
breakdown of the main result. The equilibrium switches from underprovision of
public goods to e¢ ciency. The reason is that even small imperfections on the
trade side of the model translate into imperfect mobility of capital. In other words,
transport cost in the product sector makes capital sticky. This allows governments
12In a more elaborated way, equation (20) can be be written as Ug[F(￿ k)￿t1￿ k;t1￿ k] = Uc[F(￿ k)￿
t1￿ k;t1￿ k] for country 1 and Ug[F(￿ k)￿ti￿ k=pi;ti￿ k=pi] = Uc[F(￿ k)￿ti￿ k=pi;ti￿ k=pi] for country i 6= 1.
This implies t1 = ti=pi. Inserting into F0(￿ k) ￿ t1 = r = piF0(￿ k) ￿ ti yields pi = p1 = 1 and
ti = t1 for i 6= 1. Hence, in the presence of transport cost symmetry is a result rather than an
assumption as in the Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) framework.
8to costlessly increase their tax rate until the e¢ cient solution is reached.
We are, of course, not the ￿rst ones to consider product market imperfections
in the context of capital tax competition. It seems, though, that most contribut-
ors in the ￿eld being dissatis￿ed with the assumption of perfect product markets
build their work on a di⁄erent model class inspired by Black and Hoyt (1988) and,
more recently, Melitz (2003).13 In these models, countries compete for imperfectly
competitive ￿rms and account for consumer price changes. Accounting for imper-
fect competition and ￿rms comes at the price of giving up the focus on (￿nancial)
capital markets, though, and in many cases on general equilibrium e⁄ects.
What are the implications of our ￿ndings? A general lesson might be that
product markets matter for the analysis of capital tax competition.14 Imperfections
and distortions in this part of the economy may have severe repercussions on factor
markets and, thus, on optimal capital tax policy. We certainly do not want to
claim that, due to positive transport cost, there is no tax competition at all and
the whole debate of the last twenty-￿ve years was a chimaera. However, it seems
that taking a closer look at the trade side of capital tax competition is worthwhile.
While perfect capital mobility is a plausible assumption, zero transport cost for
products is not. To sustain the classical result of ine¢ cient public goods provision
in the presence of transport cost, the model will have to be modi￿ed. A potential
modi￿cation is the assumption of product heterogeneity, as in Melitz (2003) but
by sticking to the assumption of a common ￿nancial capital market. We explore
this approach in Becker and Runkel (2010).
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